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Excerpts from Statements by Khrushchev and  
Speeches by Messrs. Herter and Dillon

Khrushchev on January 14 speaking before Supreme Soviet stated: "If, however, all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding from this."

At his press conference at Djakarta on February 29, Khrushchev stated: "The question of West Berlin is entirely different (from disarmament). This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait?"

On the same occasion he also said: ". . . we shall strive to wipe out the remnants of the war; shall try to convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR. When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR."

In

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-2-

In his press conference at Rambouillet on April 2, Khrushchev stated: "If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the leaders of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Germany, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone . . . All rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then become invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence, all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender and defeat of Nazi Germany would lose all rights connected with the occupation of the city,"

On two earlier occasions during his French trip, at the Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris on March 25 and at a luncheon at Rheims on March 29, Khrushchev had made similar threats although in briefer form.

It was with direct regard to these and other Soviet statements threatening the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany that Mr. Herter on April 4 stated publicly: "In recent months Mr. Khrushchev has repeatedly suggested in public statements that if the Western Powers do not agree to settle the German problem on his terms, he may proceed unilaterally to conclude a separate treaty with the East German regime. While he has been careful not to be too precise in his statements on the subject, the repetition of this threat cannot help but complicate the situation and affect adversely the international atmosphere."

On

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-3-

On the same day, April 4, speaking at the Lenin Stadium at Moscow, Khrushchev stated: "We shall do everything to solve this question (German peace treaty) on a basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR."

It was also in answer to these and other Soviet statements threatening unilateral action with regard to Berlin that Mr. Dillon April 20 stated: "We have repeatedly informed Mr. Khrushchev that we will not negotiate under duress. Yet in his recent statements about his intentions to sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic unless an East-West agreement is reached on Berlin, he is skating on very thin ice. We are approaching the Summit with every intention of seeking a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem, including Berlin, of seeking just settlements of other international differences, and of exploring ways to improve relations between the Western world and the Soviet bloc. Our positions are flexible, and we are willing to explore every reasonable avenue that may lead to agreement. But Mr. Khrushchev and his associates will be profoundly disillusioned if they assume that we will bow to threats or that we will accept their distorted picture of the German problem as a factual premise upon which to negotiate."

Another

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-4-

Another of the misconceptions which both Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon were seeking to correct was the Soviet idea that it was largely the USSR's growing military strength that led the United States to be interested in conducting negotiations with it. Khrushchev himself has repeatedly and recently referred to this thesis, although often in veiled form. That he fully shares it with Soviet publicists, however, is illustrated by the following excerpts from his October 31 speech to the Supreme Soviet: "Only recently the foreign policy of some Western powers was built on openly aggressive calculations. . . Now times have changed. Even some of the active exponents of the (U.S.) position of strength policy see its futility . . . The main reason lies in the growing might and international influence of the USSR."

On April 20, Mr. Dillon replied: "Soviet power and determination to expand Communist influence throughout the world pose grave and continuing threats to peace. Despite constant talk of "peaceful coexistence," there is no evidence that Communist expansionist ambitions have altered in the slightest. It is true that Soviet rulers now appear anxious to pursue their unchanging goals through non-military tactics -- through diplomacy, trade, economic aid, propaganda, and internal subversion. However, they remain confident that the

totalitarian



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-5-

totalitarian system shall prevail. Their present emphasis on non-military measures does not mean that the struggle will be less intense nor the stakes less important. The primary issue today is nothing less than the survival of free men in a free civilization.

"Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet bloc maintains enormous military power, which reinforces its constant pressure upon the free world. The risk of armed conflict is always with us. We must mount a vigorous and continuing effort to contain that risk if peace is to be kept.

"A first imperative is to maintain our military strength at a level which will ensure that the Soviet leaders will never be tempted to unleash thermonuclear war against the United States or its allies. We have such strength today, and I can assure you that our present and projected defense programs will maintain and reinforce this essential strength.

"Another imperative is to maintain and reinforce our collective system of defensive security pacts, involving nearly half a hundred nations and reaching the farthest corners of the globe. This collective strength is urgently required to deter the Communists from using local military force -- as they did ten years ago in Korea -- to expand their empire. Its need is pointed up by the actions of the Chinese Communists in the

Straits

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-6-

Straits of Taiwan, their crime against Tibet, and their recent military pressures on the borders of India.

"So long as danger persists and there is no general and effective system of arms control, we and our allies must keep up our defenses. We must not be deluded by any superficial appearance of "detente" into relaxing these efforts."



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